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A Common Law Intrusion in to the Civil Law: Carriere v.
Bank ofLouisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 1982, Richard Carriere, owner of a commercially zoned tract of
land in Metairie, Louisiana, entered into a five-year ground lease with Frank
Occhipinti. Occhipinti was interested in building a restaurant on Carriere's land.
To this end, the parties included a provision in the lease giving the lessee the right
to mortgage the lease.' After obtaining the lease, Occhipinti built the restaurant
with financing from a local bank.2 As security for the mortgage, Occhipinti pledged
in the lease,3 the restaurant and the improvements located on Carriere's
his interest
4
property.
Occhipinti filed for bankruptcy in 1988. Occhipinti thereafter failed to pay
rent to Carriere and failed to pay the 1988 property taxes he owed as stipulated in
the lease. Further, Occhipinti ceased making mortgage payments to Bank of
Louisiana (hereinafter referred to as "the bank"). Consequently, Carriere issued a
notice of default to Occhipinti. When the default was not cured, Carriere served
Occhipinti with a notice on July 7, 1989 to vacate the premises. Carriere provided
the bank with a copy of each notice. Carriere then filed a petition for eviction on
July 19, 1989. Days later, the bank filed a petition for executory process for the
Occhipinti note and collateral mortgage.6 Before Carriere's eviction proceeding
had been held, the bank purchased Occhipinti's rights in the lease at a sheriff's sale
on September 20, 1989. The purchase included the building as well as the
improvements located on Carriere's land. Subsequent to this acquisition, Carriere
amended his eviction proceeding and named the bank as a defendant, demanding
that the lease be terminated and the premises vacated. When the Louisiana
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
I. The lease also contained provisions concerning the lessee's liability for lease payments, taxes,
and insurance on the property.
2. Occhipinti originally received financing from Gulf Federal Saving and Loan Association.
However, as successor in interest, Bank of Louisiana later became the holder of the note.
3. Occhipinti's "interest in the lease" is what the common law refers to as "the leasehold
interest," or "leasehold." Although the Louisiana Civil Code does not recognize the institution of
"leasehold," the term was recognized and interpreted in Carriere v. Bank ofLouisiana, 702 So. 2d 648
(La. 1996). Leasehold is defined as: "lain estate in real property held by lessee/tenant under a lease."
See Black's Law Dictionary 890 (6th ed. 1990) and infra notes 35-38.
4. The collateral mortgage was in the amount of $1,200,000. Carriere, 702 So. 2d at 650.
5. "The bankruptcy trustee found the leasehold improvements [the restaurant] contained no

equity over and above the mortgage or liens affecting this property, and alternatively that ifthere was
any equity, it was insufficient to justify administration," and dismissed the ground lease with the
improvements from the proceedings. Id. at 651.
6. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2631 explains the "use of executory proceedings":
Executory proceedings are those which are used to effect the seizure and sale of property,
without previous citation and judgment, to enforce a mortgage or privilege thereon
evidenced by an authentic act importing a confession of judgment, and in other cases
allowed by law.
7. Carrlere, 702 So. 2d at 664.
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Supreme Court finally heard the case, the bank had occupied Carriere's land for
seven years without paying rentto Carriere, and had refused to pay taxes on the land
in accordance with the lease
In the first Louisiana Supreme Court hearing, the court awarded Carriere
damages for past rents and taxes as compensation for the use of his immovable
property upon which the bank's separately owned restaurant was located.' The
court held that when the bank purchased Occhipinti's leasehold interest at the
sheriff's sale, the bank purchased both the rights and the obligations under the lease,
including the obligation to pay Carriere rent on the property.'0 Moreover, the court
held that the doctrine of"judicial control,"" which would prevent eviction, should
be applied in this circumstance because the bank stood to lose its investment in the
property.' Thus, although the court decided not to dissolve the lease, it did find
that the bank owed Carriere past rents and taxes on the property. 3
On rehearing, the court reexamined the rights and obligations of a purchaser
ofa lessee's mortgaged "leasehold estate." The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
since the right of occupancy, use and enjoyment possessed by the lessee may be
severed from the lessee's obligation to pay rents under the lease, the bank was not
liable for rent payments to Carriere, even though the bank's tenant occupied the
land and collected rents on the restaurant from a new lessee.'" The court justified
its result by relying on two concepts. First, the court missapplied the principle set
forth in Walker v. Dohan,5 which held that the right ofoccupancy could be severed
from the obligation to pay rent, but only ifthe rents arepaid infull. Second, the
court assigned a meaning to the common law term "leasehold" that is not in the
Louisiana Civil Code. Remarkably, the court did not alter its original ruling
regarding its decision to exercise "judicial control" over the eviction proceedings
nor its decision to not terminate the lease. By neglecting to alter its prior decision
regarding these matters, the court allowed the bank to occupy the premises rent-free
and to force Carriere to continue paying taxes on the property. 6
8. Id.at 655.
9. Id. at 648.
10. Id. at 653.
11. Judicial control is ajudicially created doctrine, applicable when a lessor seeks to dissolve a
lease for failure ofthe lessee to pay the rentals timely. Although ordinarily a lessor may dissolve a lease
under these circumstances, this right is subject to judicial discretion. The court can deny dissolution
ofthe lease even though circumstances make the action proper. Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La.
828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
12. Carrlere,702 So. 2d at 655.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 662.
15. Walker v. Dohan, 39 La. Ann. 743, 2 So. 381, 382 (La. 1887).
16. The Carrierecourt further asserted that Carriere could have brought an unjust enrichment
action against the original lessee, Occhipinti. However, this argument would have been futile because
the lessee was insolvent and a remedy against him would be of little consolation to the lessor. L.S.
Tellier, Liability ofMortagee or Lienholder of a Lease with Respect to Rents or Covenants Therein,
73 A.LR 2d 1118 §3 (1960). Carriere did bring an unjust enrichment action against the bank,
however, the court reasoned that the bank's "enrichment" and Carriere's "impoverishment" were not
"without cause," and therefore Carriere was not entitled to recover rental payments and taxes from the
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NOTES
II. EVALUATION

A. Right of Occupancy versus Obligationto PayRent
1. When is it Properto Separatethe Rightfrom its Obligation?
A lease is defined by the Louisiana Civil Code as "a synallagamatic contract,
to which consent alone is sufficient, and by which one party gives to another the
enjoyment ofa thing... at a fixed price."" A lease contemplates "reciprocal rights
and obligations-the right of enjoyment, and the obligation of paying the
rent-which, so far as governed by the contract alone, co-exist and adhere to each
other."" s As such, the lessor's obligations and rights in a lease cannot be
separated. 9 However, one commentator noted:
What forbids the severance of a right from its correlative obligation, and
the transfer ofthe one without the other? The lessee's right is to occupy
the premises; his obligation, to pay the rent. Can he not make a sale or
donation of the right, retaining himself the obligation to pay the rent?o
After examining these comments, Louisiana courts have conceded that the
severance of the obligation to pay rent and the right of occupancy is legal and
possible.' However, they were still faced with the question: Under what
circumstances could the obligation to pay rent and the right of occupancy be
separated?
Louisiana courts first recognized the ability to sever the right of occupancy
from the obligation to pay rent in Walker v. Dohan.' In that case, the court held
that the sale ofthe unexpired term ofa lease involved the sale ofthe obligations and
the rights. However, the court acknowledged that the right of occupancy may be
severed from the obligation to pay the rent and that the former could be sold alone
bank. See Carrtere, 702 So. 2d at 671.
17. La. Civ. Code art. 2669.
18. Walker,39 La. Ann. at 744, 2So. at 382 (emphasis added). Both the lessor and lessee have
both obligations and rights. As ageneral rule, either the lessor or the lessee may assign their rights to
athird party; but in the absence ofany special provision, the assignee must fulfill the obligations of the
assignor. See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 2692, 2710, 1984.
19. The author acknowledges the debate among scholars as to whether alease is a real right or
a personal right. Although the courts consistently classify rights held under a lease as personal,
jurisprudence and legislation have given lessees certaincharacteristics that are more comensurate with
rights in athing than mere rights against the lessor. See Prados v. South Cent. Bell, 329 So. 2d 744 (La.
1975); Calhoun v. Gulf Ref. Co. 104 So. 2d 547, 551 (La. 1959). This debate is beyond the scope of
this article. For purposes of this article the author will adhere to the majority view that a lease is a real
right. See George M. Armstrong, Louisiana Landlord and Tenant Law, §1.1, at 3(1995). Assuming
arguendo that a lease is a personal right,and personal rights exist only when the underlying obligation
is fulfilled, then when alessee fails to pay rent on the leased property, the rights ofthe lessee in the lease
are extinguished. See La. Civ. Code art. 2674.
20. 1Hen. Dig. 803 (1861).
21. Walker, 39 La. Ann. at747,2 So. at383.
22. Id.
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only in certain circumstances.' In Walker,a men's clothing store became insolvent
and its "right of occupancy" in the leased premises was auctioned for fifty dollars
to the new lessee. The clothing store's obligation to pay rent had been secured by
certain movables in the leased premises, which had been sold and the proceeds of
which were used to pay the yearly rent. The court held that where the rent had been
paid to the lessor in full, the right of occupancy could be severed from the
obligation to pay the rent.' Therefore, the new lessee purchased only the right of
occupancy because the rent had been satisfied by the lessor's sale of the secured
movables. If the court had held otherwise, the result would have been inequitable
because the lessor would have been compensated for the rent twice.
Similarly, in D 'Aquinv. Armant, s the lessor ofabakery auctioned and sold his
lease for the stun of forty-five thousand dollars.' The purchaser soon thereafter
defaulted on the rent payments and the lessor sued for the past and future rent
payments. The purchaser argued that he never agreed to pay the rent on the lease
but had only agreed to pay the purchase price. The D'Aquin court held that where
the rent had not been satisfied, the purchaser at an auction-sale ofa lease must pay
7
the subsequent rent to the lessor according to the lease.1 The court also explained
lease, is a premium or a
the
for
that the bid, or the amount that the purchaser pays
bonus for the lease, so that the lessor enjoys the purchase price and .the rent
payments from the purchaser.' The lessee cannot "sever his rights from his
29
obligations, and transfer one without the other."
Likewise, in Brinton,Syndic v. Datas,30 the lessor sold the unexpired term of
a lease to a third party who paid only the purchase price to the lessor, but did not
pay the rent. The third party argued that the price paid for the lease was for the
occupancy of the premises during the term of the lease yet to run, and not as a
provision for the lease. The court held that where the rents have not been paid, the

23.

24.

39La.Ann.at743,2So.at381.
The dissent in Walker further stated:

(o]fwhat advantage would the right to the lease be without the right ofoccupancy, and what
would be the benefit of the right ofoccupancy without the lease? The lease confers the right
of occupancy, and the right of occupancy is the consideration of the lease... Whoever,
therefore, acquired the right ofoccupancy under the lease, acquired the lease, and whoever
bought the lease, bought the right of occupancy under it. If by purchasing the lease,

the... [purchaser] incurs the obligations of a lessee, it is clear that acquiring the right of
occupancy isacquiring the lease, and is anindisputable voluntaryassumption of consequent
obligations.
dissenting).
39 La. Ann. at 747-48, 2 So. at 384 (Bermudez, J.,
25. 14 La. Ann. 217 (1859).
26. Id.
27. D'Aquin, 14La.Ann.at218. "If indeed it were the lessor who sold his interest in the lease,
the transferee would, ofcourse, be vested with the right to collect and keep the rent accruing thereafter;
because that is the right of the lessor under the contract." Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 219. When the lease is sold at the sheriff's sale, the purchaser of the lease is agreeing
not only to pay a price for the lease, but also the rental payments for the property. The purchase price
is then considered a "bonus" and does not count toward or replace the lease payments.
29. Id.
30. 17 La. Ann. 174 (1865).
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sale of the lessee's rights in a lease to a third party imposes upon the buyer the
obligation to pay the lessor the rents accruing after the sale."
As these cases show, Louisiana courts have repeatedly held that the right of
enjoyment and the obligation to pay the rent can be severed only after the rents have
been paid infull. 32 Accordingly, Louisiana courts have formed an exception to the
general rule that the right of enjoyment and the obligation to pay the rent cannot be
severed. Considering the concepts behind Walker and its progeny, the Carriere
court incorrectly found that the bank had severed the right of occupancy from the
obligation to pay rent, because the rent on the property had not been paid in full.
Even though it is possible to separate the right ofoccupancy from the obligation to
33
pay the rent, "that right is lost when the underlying rent obligation is unfulfilled."
The naked right of occupancy in a "leasehold" setting cannot survive without
satisfaction ofthe underlying rental obligation.'
2. What is a "Leasehold"in Louisiana?
In Carriere,the court justified its decision to let the bank occupy the land rentfree by allowing the severance of the right of occupancy from the obligation to pay
rents. Under the language ofthe mortgage, Occhipinti mortgaged the "Leasehold
Estate," rather than the "Ground Lease." The court reasoned that since Occhipinti
used the terms "that Leasehold Estate," and not "the Ground Lease," Occhipinti
mortgaged only the right of occupancy and not the obligation to pay the rent. Thus,
the court defined "leasehold" as only the right of occupancy, and assigned a
meaning to the common law term "leasehold" that is not a part of the Louisiana
3
Civil Code. In fact, "[tihe term 'leasehold estate' is unknown in the civil law."
Nevertheless, the term is found in several sections of our revised statutes that deal
with leases. 6 Unfortunately, none of those statutes provide a concrete definition of
the term "leasehold." Therefore, one must look elsewhere for guidance.
A "leasehold" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: "[a]n estate in real
3
property held by lessee/tenant under a lease." " "Estate" is defined as: "[t]he
degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a person has in real ...
property. '38 Examining this common law terminology, the "extent of interest,"
discussed in the definition of "estate," seems to contemplate both the obligations as
well as the rights ofreal property. If the terms are substituted, a "leasehold" would
be an estate (or extent of interest) in real property held by the lessee. Thus, if a
31. Id.
32. Walker v. Dohan, 39 La. Ann. 743,2 So. 381 (1887); D'Aquin v. Armant, 14 La. Ann. 217
(1859); Leham v. Dreyfus, 37 La. Ann. 587 (1885); Brinton, Syndic v.Datas, 17 La. Ann. 174 (1862).
33. Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana. 702 So. 2d 648, 658 (Calogero, C.J., concurring), on reh 'g,
702 So. 2d 662 (La. 1997).
34. Id.at 658.
35. Michael H. Rubin & S. Jess Sperry, Lease Financing in Louisiana, 59 La. L Rev. 845, 863
(1999).
36. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:1131.10; 9:1131.24; 44:1; 56:499.2 and 56:700.11 (1998).
37. See Black's Law Dictionary 890 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
at 547 (emphasis added).
38. See id.
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lessee's extent of interest is the obligations as well as the rights in the lease, then the
very definition of leasehold contemplates both the obligations and the rights in the
leased property.
The Uniform Commercial Code defines a "leasehold interest" as the "interest
of the lessor or the lessee under a lease contract."39 "'Lease contract' means the
total legalobligationthat results from the lease agreement... ." Therefore, ifthe
"lease contract" contemplates the totallegalobligation,and a leasehold includes
the interests underthese obligations,then by virtue ofthese definitions, a leasehold
contemplates all the rights and obligations that arise under the lease-includingthe
payment ofthe rent. Had the Carrierecourt examined these common law sources,
it may not have determined that the clause "that leasehold estate" referred to
anything less than the entire lease-the rights as well as the obligations. As such,
the Carrierecourt was incorrect in finding that the term "leasehold estate" included
only the rights in the leased property and not its consequent obligations.
Since "leasehold" is a common law term, an examination of common law
jurisprudence regarding the application and interpretation of leaseholds is
necessary. In fact, the common law jurisprudence reveals three differing views on
the right of a lessor to hold a mortgagee of a leasehold liable for rent payments: the
"conveyance" approach, the "New York" approach, and the "California" approach.
Although the Carrierecourt did not explicitly state that it adhered to any of these
approaches, the result reached on rehearing seems to indicate that the court
followed the California approach but failed to apply it correctly.
a. The Conveyance Approach
The law in some common law states incorporates the concept that a mortgage
is a conveyance, rather than a lien. From this standpoint, when property is
mortgaged, the mortgagee actually receives the title to the property. This concept,
properly known as the "conveyance" approach operates to create "privity ofestate"
between the mortgagee ofthe leasehold interest and the lessor of the property. 4 A
consequence of this approach is that the mortgagee is liable to the lessor on the
lessee's covenants on the lease. The outcome is the same whether or not the
mortgagee has "taken possession" of the leased premises.42
For example, in Mayhew v. Hardesty,' a Maryland court regarded the
mortgagee of a leasehold as the assignee of the lease. The court applied the rule
that where a party takes an assignment of a lease, the whole legal estate passes, and
he thereby becomes liable on the real covenants, whether or not he actually
possessed or occupied the premises." Likewise in Farmers' Bank v. Mutual
39. Rev. U.C.C. § 2A-103(m).
40. Rev. U.C.C. § 2A-1030) (emphasis added).
41. Tellier, supranote16,at 1118.
42. Id.
43. 8 Md. 479 (Md. 1855).
44. Id.at 479. See also Lesterv. Hardesty, 29 Md. 50 (Md. 1868); Gibbs v. Didier, 125 Md. 486
(Md. 1915); Williams v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 167 Md. 499 (Md. 1934); Hart v. Home Owners'
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AssuranceSociety,'5 the court declared it to be well settled that where a party takes
an assignment of a lease by way of a mortgage, the whole interest passes to him.

Therefore, the assignee becomes liable on the covenant for payment of rent, even
though he has never occupied or possessed the premises.'
The conveyance approach, although equitable, does not have a place in
Louisiana law. Louisiana law does not recognize that title to a lease is transferred
by a deed of mortgage. In Louisiana, "[a] mortgage neither gives 'title' nor
possession to the mortgagee....."47
b. New York Approach
In those states that subscribe to the idea that a mortgage is a "lien" and not a
conveyance,"8 there are two distinct views as to the right of a lessor to hold a
9
mortgagee ofthe lessee's interest liable forrents under the lease." Under one view,
referred to herein as the "New York" approach, the mortgagee is liable only if he
has gone into possession of the leased premises. If the mortgagee has never had
possession, he is not liable for breach of the covenants in the lease. If the
mortgagee of a leasehold takes possession of the leased premises, he is to be
regarded as in privity of estate with the lessor and is, therefore, liable to the lessor
on the lessee's covenant to pay rent. On the other hand, if the mortgagee was never
in possession, he is not liable.
In Astor v. Hoyt," the foundation case of the New York approach, the court
recognized that the assignee of a leasehold is liable on covenants of the lease that
run with the leasehold. The court stated that: "If a mortgagee takes possession of
the mortgaged premises lawfully, he must then be considered an assignee and the
assignee must take the estate [with the burden] . 51 "Possession is the mother of [the
mortgagee's] liability."52
Because Louisiana recognizes that a mortgage is a security interest rather than
a conveyance of title, 3 the New York approach would be compatible with
Loan Corp., 169 Md. 446 (Md. 1936); Union TrustCo. v. Rosenburg 171 Md. 409 (Md. 1937); Jones
v. Burgess, 176 Md. 270 (Md. 1939); Abrahams v. Tappe, 60 Md. 317 (Md. 1883).
45. 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 69 (Va. 1832).
46. Id.
47. La. Civ. Code art. 3278 cmt. (b).
48. In jurisdictions that consider a mortgage as a 'lien" and not a conveyance, a mortgage is a
security arrangement and creates in the mortgage a lien rather than conveying full title. Seeinfranotes
48-58 and accompanying text.
49. See generally North Chicago Street IL Co. v. Le Grand Co., 95 Ill. App. 435 (111.1901);
Olcese v. Val Blatz Brewing Co., 144 Ill. App. 597 (111.1908); McKee v. Angelrodt. 16 Mo. 283 (Mo.
1852); Smith v. Brinker, 17 Mo. 148 (Mo. 1852); Knox v. Bailey, 4 Mo. App. 581 (Mo. 1877); State
ex rel Johnson v. Commercial State Bank. 142 Neb. 752 (Neb. 1943); Century Holding Co. v. Ebling
Brewing Co., 173 N.Y.S. 49 (1918); Levy v. Long Island Brewery, 56 N.Y.S. 242 (1899); Talley v.
James Everard's Breweries, 116 N.Y.S. 657 (1909); Astor v. Hoyt, 5 Wend. 603 (N.Y. 1830).
50. 5 Wend. 603 (N.Y. 1830).
51. Id. at603.
52. McKee v. Angelrodt, 16 Mo. 283 (Mo. 1852).
53. See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
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Louisiana law. In the Carrierecase, the application of the New York approach
would have been equitable, making the bank liable for the rents. This result seems
only fair because the bank was occupying the land, collecting rent from the lessees,
and having Carriere pay property taxes. Nevertheless, the Carrierecourt did not
follow the New York approach. Rather, it seems to have taken an approach
developed by the California courts.
c. CaliforniaApproach
Under the third related common law approach, herein referred to as the
"California" approach, whether such mortgagee is or is not in possession of the
premises is immaterial.' Based on this approach a mortgagee of a leasehold can
*under no circumstances be regarded, at leastpriortoforeclosureofthe mortgage,
as holding the same interest in the leasehold as the original lessee. Consequently,
he is not an assignee of the lease, and therefore not liable for payment of rent.
However, the California approach does not seem to apply to situations where
the mortgagee has already foreclosed on the property. In Johnsonv. Sherman,55the
leading case on this approach, the mortgagee had taken possession of the premises,
but had not foreclosed on the mortgage. The court noted that in California, a
mortgagee is regarded as never having the title to the mortgaged property until
judicialforeclosure and sale.56 Although the court does not discuss this point, it
seems to make the distinction that a mortgagee, once he has foreclosed on the
property, effectively becomes the assignee of the lease. Thereafter, the mortgagee
becomes liable on the obligations ofthe lease.5
Although the Carrierecourt seems to have adopted the California approach to
the mortgaging of leaseholds in Louisiana, the Carrierecourt failed to make the
distinction that the Johnson court did. Based on the holding in Johnson, the
California approach would not apply in a case such as Carriere,because the bank
had already foreclosed on the mortgage. Therefore, while the bank would not have
been liable for rents accruing before the foreclosure ofthe mortgage, the California
approach would have made the bank liable for rents accruing thereafter. As such,
although the Carrierecourt did not specifically state that it was following the
California approach, the Carrierecourt applied the California approach incorrectly
by allowing the bank to occupy the land rent-free after the foreclosure of the
mortgage.
Louisiana courts must decide when it is appropriate to separate the right of
occupancy from its consequent obligations. Louisiana courts should be faithful to
the Louisiana civil law tradition and apply Walker to all leasehold situations,
thereby allowing the right ofoccupancy to be separated from the obligation to pay
rent only when the rents are paid in full. However, if Louisiana courts continue to

54.

Tellier, supranote 16, at 1118.

55.

15 Cal. 287 (Cal. 1860).

56. Id. at 287 (emphasis
57.

Id. at 289.

added).
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follow the common law approaches to leasehold situations, they must choose one
approach and then correctly apply it. Either the New York approach or the
California approach would be appropriate considering Louisiana's view on
mortgages.58 However, the New York approach seems more equitable because it
takes into account whether the mortgagor is occupying the land.
B. JudicialControl: When is it ProperlyApplied?
On rehearing, the Carrierecourt did not reverse its original decision to exercise
"judicial control" over the eviction proceedings and choose to not terminate the
lease. By neglecting to reverse its decision, the court allowed the bank to occupy
the premises rent-free and forced Carriere to continue paying taxes on the property.
The Louisiana Civil Code states that: "[t]he lessee may be expelled from the
59
'
property ifhe fails to pay the rent when it becomes due." However, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has held that although a lessor may ordinarily dissolve a lease for
failure of the lessee to pay rentals timely, this right is subject to judicial control
according to the circumstances.' The cases where courts have applied judicial
control of leases generally involve circumstances where a lessee has made a good
6
faith errot and acted reasonably to correct it. An examination of the cases
illustrates when the doctrine of judicial control is properly applied.
6'
In Brewer v. ForestGravel Co., the lessor sought cancellation of the lease
because the lessee withheld part ofthe rent on a mineral lease to pay severance tax.
The lessor contended that the lessee owed the severance tax. The court ruled that
of
the tax was indeed owed by the lessee, but refused to cancel the lease because
63
nonpayment of the portion ofthe rent withheld by the lessee to pay the tax. The

supreme court concluded that the lessee did not arbitrarily refuse to pay the rent but

made a good faith error by refusing to pay more than he believed was due." The
court held that under such circumstances it would be inequitable to the lessee to

cancel the lease."
Similarly, in Edwards v. StandardOil CO. of Louisiana,' the lessee's rent

payment became due on July 15, 1931. The lessee had mailed a check to its local
agent for delivery to the lessor on July 10, 1931, but the check did not reach the

lessor until six days after the due date "owing to some oversight, or perhaps some

58. See text accompanying supra notes 48-58.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 2712.
60. See Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931); Huckabay v. Red River
Waterway Conmmi'n, 663 So. 2d 414 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995); Sieward v. Denechaud, 120 La. 720,730,
45 So. 561,564 (1908).
61. Brewer v.Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828,135 So. 372 (1931); Edwards v. Standard Oil Co.
of Louisiana, 175 La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932); Baham v. Faust, 333 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1976).
62. 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
63. Id.at 832, 136 So. at 373.
64. Id.

65. Id.
66.

175 La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932).
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fault in mail deliver[y]." 7' The lessor refused to accept the check and returned it to
the lessee. The supreme court reversed the lower court's judgment canceling the
lease for failure to timely pay the rent, reasoning that it would be inequitable to the
lessee who had mailed the rent payment on time.s
InBaham v. Faust,' the lessee's rent payment was due on February 28, 1975.
The rent was not received by lessor's attorney until March 8, 1975 and was refused
at that time. The court noted that the lease did not provide for a place of payment.
Further, the parties in this case had not established a custom of making payment at
a particular location.70 Therefore, the lessor was required to collect the rent at the
lessee's dwelling according to Louisiana Civil Code article 1862. "' Additionally,
the court looked to the fact that the lessee was willing to pay the rent: "The record
contains ample evidence ofthe willingness of the [lessee] to pay the rent when due.
The lessor cannot create a cause of action entitling him to cancel the lease by his
own failure to collect the rent at the place where due."7"
In Belvin v. Sikes," the lessors sued for the dissolution of their lease because
ofnon-payment ofrent by the lessee. The lessee owed rent twice yearly, on the first
ofMarch and September. On February 28, 1939, the lessee paid the lessors the rent
that was to discharge his rent obligation up to September 1, 1939. However, the
receipt given by the lessors to the lessee erroneously read "in full payment of lease
up to Oct. 1, 1939." On October 2, 1939, the lessee tendered the amount that would
have paid the rent until March 1, 1940. This tender was refused, and the lessor told
the lessee that the lease was terminated due to non-payment of rent and that the
lessee was expected to vacate the premises.74 The court found that the October 2
tender prevented the lease from lapsing and continued the life of the lease. The
court held that thee lessee relied in good faith upon the receipt stating that the rent
was paid until October 1, 1939. Therefore, the court invoked judicial control and
refused to terminate the lease."
In Tullier v. Tanson Enterprises,Inc.,6 the lessee failed to pay the rent
due on December 1, 1975 and January 1, 1976. The lessor mailed two
notices of default, as required by the lease, to the lessee." On March 1,
1976 the lessee wired the lessor a sum sufficient to pay the 1975 property
67.

Id. at 721, 144 So. at 431.

68. Id.

69. 333 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 262.
71. La. Civ. Codeart. 1862 provides in part:
Performance shall be Tendered in the place either stipulated in the agreement or intended by
the parties according to usage, thenature ofthe performance, or other circumstances. Inthe
absence of agreement or other indication of the parties' intent,... the perfonmance shall be
rendered at the domicile of the obligor.
72. Baham, 333 So. 2d at 263.
73. 2 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941).
74. Id. at 66.
75.

Id. at 67.

76. 359 So. 2d 654 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
77. Id. at 658.
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taxes, attorney fees, and rentals due through April 1976. The lessor received
the funds on March 3, 1976, but refused to accept them. The lessor
7
thereafter sued to evict the lessee." The court held that the payment made
following the default notices was untimely due to no fault of the tenant
because ofa malfunction of the transmittal device of the bank that forwarded the
funds, and because ofMardi Gras, a bank holiday. The court found that the lessee
had made a good faith effort to cure his default by submitting rentals and paying the
taxes. Therefore, the court exercised judicial control and refused to cancel the
lease. 9
Similarly, the court reversed, a lease cancellation in Housing Authority
of the City of Lake Charles v. Minor.' On May 9, 1977, the deadline for
the May rent, the lessee's wife paid the rent with a third-party check from
the lessee's employer. The lessor returned the check due to insufficient
funds on Friday, May 13, 1977 and on the same day delivered a written
notice to the lessee's wife demanding that the lessee vacate the premises for nonpayment ofrent. The lessee's wife paid the rent the following Monday. The lessor
accepted the payment but deposited the check into an escrow account pending the
eviction proceedings."' Reasoning that it would have been inequitable to the lessee
to cancel the lease, the court exircised judicial control and refused to cancel the
lease.

2

As these cases show, Louisiana courts exercise judicial control only in
special circumstances. These circumstances are limited to cases where it
would be inequitable to the lessee for the lease to be terminated. In
Carriere, by foreclosing on the mortgage and purchasing the leasehold
themselves, the bank extinguished the mortgage by confusion, thereby
replacing Occhipinti as lessee." As lessee, the bank willfully refused to pay
rent to Carriere. Therefore, dissolution of the lease and eviction would have
been proper under the doctrine of judicial control because the willful
nonpayment of rent by the bank was inequitable to Carriere, not the lessee, for
whom the doctrine was established. Because it was inequitable to Carriere and
allowed the bank to occupy the land rent-free, the Carriere court incorrectly
decided not to overturn the earlier ruling exercising judicial control, thereby
abusing the doctrine ofjudicial control.

78. Id. at 659.
79. Id. at 660.
80. 355 So. 2d 271 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
81. Id. at272,273.
82. Id. at 274, 275.
83. See Department ofCulture, Recreation & Tourism ofthe State ofLouisiana v. Fort Macomb
Dev. Corp., 385 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980). When Occhipinti stopped making
mortgage payments, the bank had two options to recover its losses. The bank could either "step into
the lessee's shoes" or could foreclose on the property. The bank chose the later, but by buying the
mortgaged property, the bank extinguished the mortgage through confusion and in actuality, replaced
Occhipinti as the lessee. See Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 702 So. 2d 648 (La. 1997). Consequently,
the bank should have been liable to Carriere for rents.
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EFFECTS OF CARRIERE, RELEGATION TO CONTRACT LAW, AND How TO AVOID
TH E RESULT OF CARRIERE V.BANK OFLOUISANA

If the Louisiana courts and the Louisiana Legislature do not recognize
the error of Carrere, the decision will hinder the operation of Louisiana
Civil Code article 3286," which provides for mortgaging of leases, thereby
inhibiting commerce. After the Carruere decision, would a lessor allow his
leased property to be mortgaged knowing that if the leasehold was foreclosed
on, the lessor would not be able to compel the mortgagee to pay rent on
the property that he possessed? The owners of raw land will not receive
money from the use of the property, and they will have to pay taxes to
keep it. What economic incentive is there? As a result, owners of land will
not allow lessees to mortgage their interest in leased property. Instead,
property owners will either wait to sell their property for cash or deal only
with those people who are in great financial shape. Investors like Occhipinti in
Carrierewill not be able to start their own business. Although this decision is great
news for banks-who is going to agree to be the lessor? The result of Carrierewill
inhibit the mortgaging of a lessee's interest in leased property (or "leaseholds" in
common law terminology). A corollary of this result is that lessors will never
execute leases like the one in Carriereagain, and lessees will be the ones who
suffer. Louisiana courts must resolve this issue for Louisiana landowners to be able
to compete in the national marketplace. To avoid inhibiting the.use of Louisiana
Civil Code article 3286, Carriereshould be read as standing forthe proposition that
parties are generally permitted to negotiate the kind of deal they desire. The
inequitable result in Carr/erewould thereby be narrowed to an interpretation of
contract law, rather than a general statement concerning the mortgaging ofrights in

leased property.
In order to avoid the result in Carriere,parties should be more vigilant
in drafting lease documents. Specifically, attorneys for the lessors should
draft mortgage contracts that explicitly provide that the mortgagee will be
liable for rents if the mortgagor/lessee defaults on the rent payments.

Attorneys should examine the lease in CaMere and avoid its language, being
careful not to use common law terminology frivolously. Further, Louisiana
attorneys should provide definitions of the language they use in the contract,

or at the very least, make sure the terminology used is well defined in
Louisiana jurisprudence. Lawyers should take care not to be sloppy in this
respect, and keep in mind that even though Louisiana attorneys habitually use
common law terms, the terms may not have meaning in Louisiana civil law.
Attorneys should also note that Carriere later sued his lawyers in malpractice
for their mistake.

84. The pertinent part of La. Civ. Code Art. 3286 provides:
The only things susceptible ofmortgage are:
(4) The lessee's rights in a lease of an immovable with his rights in the buildings and other
constructions on the immovable.
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NOTES
IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the holding in Walker," the Carrierecourt incorrectly held that the
bank had severed the right ofoccupancy from the obligation to pay the rent and had
purchased the right of occupancy alone. Even though it is possible to separate the
right of occupancy from the obligation to pay the rent, "that right is lost when the
underlying rent obligation is unfulfilled."" The naked right of occupancy in a
leasehold setting cannot survive without satisfaction of the underlying rental
obligation." Therefore, where the rent on mortgaged property has not been paid in
full, the obligation to pay the rent cannot be separated from the right ofoccupancy.
Consequently, the Carierecourt incorrectly allowed the bank to occupy the land
without paying rent to Carriere.
The Carriere court not only disregarded the Walker decision, but also
misapplied the chosen common law doctrine on leaseholds. Further, no reasoning
was offered as to why the court chose this path. The court simply pointed to Walker
to show that the separation ofthe rights from the obligations was possible, but then
failed to apply the Walkerholding properly. To add insult to injury, the court then
failed to apply the California approach correctly.
Finally, the Carrierecourt should have overturned the prior ruling exercising
judicial control over the lease. Louisiana courts applyjudicial control only in such
cases where it would be inequitable to the lessee for the lease to be terminated. In
Carriere,the bank essentially became the lessee when it purchased the leasehold
and extinguished the mortgage by confusion." Thereafter, the bank continued to
occupy Carriere's property rent-free. To terminate the lease in this situation would
certainly not be inequitable to the lessee. As such, the Carrierecourt incorrectly
concluded not to overturn the earlier ruling exercising judicial control. This
oversight has allowed the bank to occupy Carriere's land rent-free and without
paying property taxes from 1989 until the lease expires in 2002. By not overturning
the earlier ruling, the court abused the doctrine of judicial control, allowing the
doctrine to be exercised in favor of a lessee who willingly, and to its advantage,
failed to pay rent to the lessor. Since the doctrine of judicial control was
established to protect innocent lessees, the court should amend this ruling to avoid
misuse in the future.
Due to the increase in interstate markets, there will continue to be conflicts
between the common law and the civil law traditions. In addition to the differences
between the common law and the civil law, each common law jurisdiction has
conflicting approaches to mortgaging a lessee's interest in a lease, resulting in
divergent outcomes. Therefore, it is important that Louisiana courts decide
beforehand which approach should be taken so that the reasoning is clear and
attorneys can predict the outcome. If the Carrieredecision is not corrected soon,
85. See supratext accompanying note 22.
86. 'Carriere v. Bank of Louisiana, 702 So. 2d 648, 658 (Calogero, C.J., concurring), on reh 'g,
702 So. 2d 648,653 (La. 1997).
87. Carere, 702 So. at 653-54.
88. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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Louisiana courts will continue to apply Louisiana lease law incorrectly and will
befuddle corrmerce and investment in Louisiana.
MarianneRabalais.

* The author wishes to thank Warren L Mengis, the Joe W. Sanders Professor of Law at
Louisiana State University Law Center for the guidance he contributed in directing this casenote. Also,
the author would like to thank Robert R. Rabalais, the author's brother-imitationis the most sincere
form offlattery.

